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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit continued 
its recent trend of issuing only a handful of trademark decisions—eight 
decisions were issued from March to December1—followed by the 
reinstatement of the trademark aspects of one such decision in May 
2017.2  Notably, although the Federal Circuit’s caseload hit a twenty-year 
high in 2016—addressing 1839 appeals3—trademark cases composed 
only two percent of the court’s overall docket.4  Over the past decade, 
trademark cases have not represented more than three percent of the 
Federal Circuit’s docket and fell to a low of one percent in 2015.5 
Nonetheless, as aptly illustrated by the court’s decisions in 2015—
                                               
 1. See Emerald Cities Collaborative, Inc. v. Roese, 666 F. App’x 908 (Fed. Cir. 
2016); In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d 936 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Christian Faith Fellowship 
Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re Light, 662 F. App’x 929 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016); Westlake v. Barrera, 659 F. App’x 622 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam); In re 
Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. 
(Romag I), 817 F.3d 782 (Fed. Cir. 2016); JBLU, Inc. v. United States, 813 F.3d 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 2. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag II), 686 F. App’x. 889 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (per curiam). 
 3. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, HISTORICAL CASELOAD (2017), 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/Historical_ 
Caseload_Graph_83-17.pdf. 
 4. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILED, BY CATEGORY:  FY 
2016 (2017), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/FY16_ 
Caseload_by_Category.pdf. 
 5. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILE, BY CATEGORY:  FY 2015 
(2016), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Caseload%20by%20Category 
%20%282015%29.pdf (reporting trademark cases as making up one percent of the Federal 
Circuit docket); see also Statistics, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/ 
the-court/statistics (last visited May 9, 2018) (providing annual statistics from Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2006 through FY 2017 under the “Caseload, by Category” section, indicating 
that trademark appeals have constituted no more than three percent of the Federal 
Circuit’s docket in the last decade). 
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including In re Tam6 and Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics. Co.,7 which raised 
issues later addressed by the Supreme Court—the relatively small number 
of trademark decisions should not be equated with a small contribution 
to trademark jurisprudence.8  As discussed in detail below, the Federal 
Circuit’s 2016 decisions continue the practice of making an outsized 
contribution with only a few well-reasoned decisions.9 
I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES 
The Federal Circuit issued five decisions addressing substantive 
trademark issues in 2016 and reinstated one of these decisions in 2017.  
Each of these decisions is discussed below. 
A. Meaning of “Trademark” in Tariff Act 
1. JBLU, Inc. v. United States 
For its first trademark case of 2016, JBLU, Inc. v. United States,10 the 
Federal Circuit reversed the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) 
to hold that the term “trademark,” as used in a regulation 
implementing section 304 of the Tariff Act, was clear on its face and 
referred to both federally registered and common law unregistered 
trademarks.  The Federal Circuit rejected the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection’s (CBP) narrow interpretation which only accounted for 
federally registered trademarks.11 
This case arose from jean shipments from China to a U.S.-based 
                                               
 6. 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) 
(addressing First Amendment issues related to registration of disparaging marks). 
 7. 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (addressing 
functionality of registered trade dress for design of on-screen icons). 
 8. See Linda K. McLeod & Lindsay B. Allen, 2015 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal 
Circuit, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1029–30 (2016) (emphasizing the significance of Tam and 
noting that the decision will likely shape trademark examinations going forward). 
 9. This Article uses the term “trademark decisions” to refer primarily to decisions 
that substantively address claims under the Lanham (Trademark) Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1051–1141n (2012), and the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1683 (2012).  
Practitioners should be aware that this Article is a survey only of the 2016 trademark 
decisions issued by the Federal Circuit that substantively address trademark issues, and 
that other opinions issued by the Federal Circuit in 2016 may also impact trademark 
law practice but are not considered or discussed herein.  For a summary of 2017 
trademark decisions, see Anita B. Polott & Rachel E. Fertig, 2017 Trademark Law 
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 67 Am. U. L. Rev. 1355 (2018). 
 10. 813 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 11. Id. at 1382. 
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importer.12  Between September 11, 2010 and October 20, 2010, 
California-based company JBLU, Inc., operating under the name C’est 
Toi Jeans USA, imported over 350,000 pairs of jeans embroidered with 
“C’est Toi Jeans USA,” “CT Jeans USA,” and “C’est Toi Jeans Los 
Angeles”—all of which were manufactured in China.13  Simultaneously, 
JBLU also filed for federal registration of two trademarks: “C’est Toi 
Jeans USA” and “CT Jeans USA” (collectively, “CT Marks”).14  Upon 
arrival to the United States, CBP inspected the jeans and found that 
their “Made in China” tags were not sufficiently conspicuous to mark the 
country of origin for the jeans, as required under section 304 of the 
Tariff Act and its implementing regulations.15  In particular, the 
implementing regulations—19 C.F.R. § 134.46 and 19 C.F.R. § 134.47—
provide distinct standards for marking the country of origin in instances 
where a geographical location—such as “United States,”  “USA,” “or the 
name of any city or location in the United States”16—appears on an 
imported article and may mislead the ultimate purchaser as to the actual 
country of origin.17 
For importers, the two regulations have different consequences.  
Under 19 C.F.R. § 134.46, the imported article must be marked with 
the country of origin “in close proximity to [the location] words [(e.g., 
USA)]” and “in at least a comparable size” font.18  By contrast, under 
                                               
 12. Id. at 1378. 
 13. Id. (“[I]n various fonts on their backs, pocket linings, back waistbands, and 
hangtags.”). See Kevin J. Fandl, 2016 International Trade Law Decisions of the Federal 
Circuit, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1381, 1402–04 (2018). 
 14. JBLU, Inc., 813 F.3d at 1378 (noting that applications were submitted on 
October 8, 2010). 
 15. Id.  Section 304 of the Tariff Act requires marking of the country-of-origin—in 
this case China—“in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the 
nature of the article . . . will permit” as specified in regulations issued by the Secretary 
of Treasury, i.e., Customs.  Id. at 1378–79 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2012)). 
 16. 19 C.F.R. § 134.46 (2017). 
 17. JBLU, Inc., 813 F.3d at 1379. 
 18. 19 C.F.R. § 134.46 discusses the use of a mark when the name of a country 
other than the country of origin is used: 
In any case in which the words “United States,” or “American,” the letters 
“U.S.A.,” any variation of such words or letters, or the name of any city or 
location in the United States, or the name of any foreign country or locality 
other than the country or locality in which the article was manufactured or 
produced appear on an imported article or its container, and those words, 
letters or names may mislead or deceive the ultimate purchaser as to the actual 
country of origin of the article, there shall appear legibly and permanently in 
close proximity to such words, letters or name, and in at least a comparable 
size, the name of the country of origin preceded by “Made in,” “Product of,” 
2018] 2016 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS 1415 
 
19 C.F.R. § 134.47, when “the name of a location in the United States 
or ‘United States’” appears as “part of a trademark or trade name,” the 
country of origin marking only needs to be “in close proximity [to the 
location of the words, letters, or name] or in some other conspicuous 
location.”  And § 134.47 does not require the imported article’s 
country of origin to be written in a comparable font size.19 
Noting the small font and distant location of the “Made in China” 
mark from the prominent embroidery in the jeans, CBP found JBLU in 
violation of the more stringent standard under § 134.46 with respect to 
the jeans imported before it had filed for federal trademark registration 
of the CT Marks.20  For these jeans imported before an application for 
federal registration had been filed, CBP determined that JBLU’s use of 
the embroidered words “USA” and “Los Angeles” could not be 
considered part of a trademark; thus, such jeans could not be evaluated 
under the more lenient country-of-origin standard under § 134.47.21 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the CIT upheld CBP’s 
application of the strict standard under § 134.46, according CBP’s 
narrow interpretation of “trademark” under § 134.47 substantial 
deference because the term was not defined and CBP’s interpretation 
was not plainly erroneous.22  JBLU appealed.23 
The Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s determination de novo and 
reversed its decision.24  Specifically, the court rejected the CIT’s 
deference to CBP and re-affirmed that “[i]f a regulation is clear on its 
face, no deference is given to the promulgating agency’s 
interpretation.”25  Instead, the regulation is interpreted “in accordance 
with its unambiguous meaning.”26  In this case, the Federal Circuit held 
that the “[t]he word ‘trademark’ in  § 134.47 unambiguously includes 
trademarks without a pending [federal trademark] application.”27  The 
Federal Circuit explained that this interpretation was consistent with 
dictionary and Lanham Act definitions that existed at the time of the 
                                               
or other words of similar meaning. 
19 C.F.R. § 134.46. 
 19. Id. § 134.47. 
 20. JBLU, Inc., 813 F.3d at 1379–80. 
 21. Id. at 1379. 
 22. Id. at 1380. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1380, 1382. 
 25. Id. at 1380. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1381. 
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original issuance of § 134.47.28  Moreover, the court noted that the 
current Lanham Act definition of trademark continues to support this 
broad interpretation because “trademark rights stem from use, not 
registration,”29 and, as recognized in San Juan Products, Inc. v. San Juan 
Pools of Kansas, Inc.,30 “[t]he Lanham Act protects unregistered marks as 
does the common law.”31  Thus, “trademark” within the meaning of 
§ 134.47 included federally registered and common-law trademarks.  
Accordingly, CBP should have applied the more lenient marking 
requirement under § 134.47. 
B. Willfulness Requirement to Recover Infringer’s Profits 
1. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. ( Romag I) 
In its first decision in Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag I ),32 the 
Federal Circuit considered an appeal from a decision of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Connecticut, finding that, as a matter of law in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a trademark owner could not 
recover a defendant’s profits for trademark infringement where the jury 
had found that the defendant’s trademark infringement was not willful.33 
Trademark owner, Romag Fasteners, Inc. (“Romag”), owns a patent 
on magnetic snap fasteners, which it sells—for wallets, purses, 
handbags, and other products—under its registered trademark, 
ROMAG (Registration No. 2,095,367).34  Beginning in 2002, Fossil, Inc. 
(“Fossil”) agreed to use ROMAG magnetic snap fasteners in Fossil 
products and to purchase the fasteners from the authorized 
manufacturer, Wing Yip Metal Manufactory Accessories Limited 
(“Wing Yip”).35  Years later, in 2010, Romag learned that some Fossil 
handbags contained counterfeit fasteners and filed suit against Fossil 
and retailers of its products for trademark and patent infringement.36 
                                               
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. 849 F.2d 468, 474 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that both the Lanham Act and the 
common law protect unregistered marks). 
 31. JBLU, Inc., 813 F.3d at 1381. 
 32. 817 F.3d 782 (Fed. Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1373 (2017). 
 33. Id. at 784–85. 
 34. Id. at 783 (noting that Romag “owns U.S. Patent No. 5,777,126 (‘the ’126 
patent’) on magnetic snap fasteners”); see Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag 
III), 866 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that Romag owns Patent No. 
5,722,126 and trademark Registration No. 2,095,367). 
 35. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 783. 
 36. Id. 
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At trial, Fossil was found liable for patent and trademark infringement.37  
With respect to trademark infringement, the jury recommended an award 
comprised of “$90,759.36 of Fossil’s profits under an unjust enrichment 
theory, and $6,704,046.00 of Fossil’s profits under a deterrence theory.”38  
The district court, however, dismissed the recommended trademark award 
as contrary to law because the Second Circuit required willfulness to award 
an infringer’s profits, and Fossil had not been found to have willfully 
infringed the ROMAG mark.39  Romag appealed this decision to the 
Federal Circuit claiming, inter alia, that to recover an infringing 
defendant’s profits as damages, a trademark owner does not have to 
prove that an infringer acted willfully.40 
As part of its de novo review of the legal standard for awarding profits 
derived from trademark infringement, the Federal Circuit undertook 
an extensive analysis of the Lanham Act’s legislative history, as well as 
the numerous court opinions creating an apparent circuit split 
concerning whether willfulness is required to obtain an infringer’s 
profits.41  Starting with cases supporting a willfulness requirement, the 
Federal Circuit discussed the decisions of several courts of appeals, 
including George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc.42 from the Second Circuit, 
whose precedent governed this case.43  Notably, George Basch held that 
“under [15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)] of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove 
that an infringer acted with willful deception before the infringer’s 
                                               
 37. Id. at 784.  In addition to the trademark damages discussed above, the jury 
found that Fossil was liable for patent infringement and recommended a reasonable 
royalty award to Romag of $ 51,052.14.  Id.  However, because Romag waited to bring 
the suit until just three days before “Black Friday,” the district court deemed such delay 
to constitute laches, which bars claims if the plaintiff’s unreasonable delay causes the 
defendant undue prejudice, and thus reduced the jury’s reasonable royalty award by 
“[eighteen percent] to exclude sales made during the period of delay.”  Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 784–85. 
 40. Id. at 784. 
 41. Id. at 784–85, 787. 
 42. 968 F.2d 1532 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 43. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 785–86 (citing SecuraComm Consulting Inc. v. Securacom 
Inc., 166 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A] plaintiff must prove that an infringer acted 
willfully before the infringer’s profits are recoverable.”(alteration in original); ALPO 
Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990)), superseded by 
statute, Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–43, 113 Stat. 218 (1999), 
as recognized in Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168 (3d. Cir. 2005); Bishop v. 
Equinox Int’l Corp., 154 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n award of profits 
requires proof that ‘“defendant’s actions were willful or in bad faith.’”)).  The Federal 
Circuit noted that these cases pre-dated the 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act.  Id. 
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profits [could be] recoverable by way of an accounting.”44  The Federal 
Circuit also noted that, although the Supreme Court had never 
addressed whether proof of willfulness is a prerequisite to recovering 
an infringing party’s profits, the Court had issued two pre-Lanham Act 
opinions that remained relevant to the question.45 
First, in Saxlehner v. Siegel-Cooper Co.,46 the Court held that a group of 
trademark infringers who had either “acted in good faith” or made 
only small sales, “should not be required to account for gains and 
profits.”47  Second, in Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co.,48 
the Supreme Court “affirmed an accounting of [an] infringer’s profits 
where” there was “abundant evidence” to show that the defendant 
“persiste[d] in the unlawful simulation in the face of the very plain 
notice of [the trademark owner’s] rights.”49 
As additional support, the Federal Circuit cited The Restatement (Third) 
of Unfair Competition, which “took the position that ‘[o]ne . . . is liable for 
the net profits earned on profitable transactions resulting from 
[trademark infringement], but only if . . . the actor engaged in the 
conduct with the intention of causing confusion or deception.’”50  To 
illustrate the circuit split, the Federal Circuit also discussed decisions from 
several courts of appeals that generally took the position that willfulness 
was a relevant factor—but not a prerequisite—to awarding defendant’s 
profits derived from trademark infringement.51 
                                               
 44. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting George Basch Co., 968 F.2d at 1540 
(explaining further that a “finding of willful deceptiveness is necessary in order to 
warrant an accounting for profits . . . [but] it may not be sufficient” (first alteration in 
original))).  The Federal Circuit also cited Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy 
Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996) (“In order to recover an 
accounting of an infringer’s profits, a plaintiff must prove that the infringer acted in 
bad faith.”)).  Id. at 785. 
 45. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 785. 
 46. 179 U.S. 42 (1900). 
 47. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 785 (quoting Saxlehner, 179 U.S. at 42–43). 
 48. 240 U.S. 251 (1916). 
 49. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 785 (last two alterations in original) (quoting Hamilton-
Brown Shoe Co., 240 U.S. at 261). 
 50. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 37(1) (AM. LAW INST., 1995)). 
 51. Id. at 786.  The Federal Circuit cited to cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit to support its 
finding.  See id. (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554 (5th Cir. 
1998) (holding that “the intent to confuse or deceive” is only a “relevant factor[ ] to 
the court’s determination of whether an award of profits is appropriate”); Wynn Oil 
Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 607 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that proof of 
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Romag argued that the Second Circuit’s George Basch opinion and 
similar cases were invalidated by a 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act.52  
In responding to, and ultimately rejecting, this argument, the Federal 
Circuit explained that when George Basch and similar decisions were 
issued—before the 1999 amendment—“the Lanham Act [under 
§ 1117(a)] permitted recovery only for violations of § 1125(a), i.e., 
trademark infringement and false advertising.”53  Between 1996 and 1999, 
Congress amended the Lanham Act a number of times to create a new 
cause of action for trademark dilution and accompanying injunctive and 
monetary relief.54  Notably, in 1999, Congress had to amend § 1117(a) to 
correct an error from the 1996 amendments that had omitted language 
necessary to award monetary relief for willful dilution.55  As relevant to this 
case, the current language of § 1117(a) states that 
[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered 
in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 
1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of 
this title, shall have been established in any civil action arising under 
this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions 
of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles 
of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages 
sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.56 
Romag interpreted the change made under the 1999 amendment—
specifically, the express inclusion of the “willful” requirement for 
violations under § 1125(c) for dilution without adding a similarly express 
requirement for trademark infringement under § 1125(a)—to prove 
that:  (1) “Congress chose to make willful infringement a prerequisite to 
                                               
actual confusion is not required to recover profits, and quoting the Seventh Circuit 
rule that “there is no express requirement . . . that the infringer willfully infringe . . . 
to justify an award of profits”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roulo v. 
Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989)); Roulo, 886 F.2d at 941 (“Other 
than general equitable considerations, there is no express requirement that . . . the 
infringer willfully infringe the trade dress to justify an award of profits.”); Burger King 
Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 781 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Nor is an award of profits based 
on either unjust enrichment or deterrence dependent upon a higher showing of 
culpability on the part of the defendant, who is purposely using the trademark.”)). 
 52. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 786–88. 
 53. Id. at 787. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (citing Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–43, § 3(b), 
113 Stat. 218, 219 (1999)) (alterations in original) (explaining that the 1996 
amendment made available “‘the remed[y] set forth in section[ ] 1117(a) without 
amending § 1117(a) to provide for such monetary remedies in the case of dilution”). 
 56. Id. at 787–88 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012)). 
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recovery of monetary relief for trademark dilution”; and (2) Congress 
“did not intend [for] willful infringement to be a prerequisite to recovery 
of monetary relief for the other types of infringement covered by that 
section, including the sale of counterfeits.”57 
The Federal Circuit disagreed with Romag’s arguments based on the 
1999 amendment and interpreted the addition of the 
“willful violation” language . . . to distinguish dilution cases from, inter 
alia, infringement cases in the area of damages (as opposed to 
profits), since it was established in the courts of appeals that willfulness 
was not required for damages recovery, . . .  and Congress wished to 
limit damages awards for dilution to cases involving willfulness.58 
Although the Federal Circuit acknowledged that certain circuits 
shared Romag’s interpretation,59  the Federal Circuit applies the law of 
the circuit from which a case is appealed.60  Thus, the Federal Circuit 
evaluated the case according to Second Circuit precedent, which, like 
many other circuits,61 continued, after the 1999 amendment, to 
require the trademark owner to prove the defendant’s willful 
infringement in order to secure an award of profits for all violations 
covered under § 1117(a).62  Of particular importance to the Federal 
Circuit was a 2014 Second Circuit decision, Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis 
S.P.A.,63 which reaffirmed George Basch’s holding that “a finding of 
defendant’s willful deceptiveness is a prerequisite for awarding 
                                               
 57. Id. at 788. 
 58. Id. at 790. 
 59. Id. at 788 (citing Laukus v. Rio Brands, Inc., 391 F. App’x 416, 424 (6th Cir. 
2010); Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 175 (4th Cir. 2006); Banjo 
Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2005) (“By adding this word 
[‘willful’] to the statute in 1999, but limiting it to [§ 1125(c)] violations, Congress 
effectively superseded the willfulness requirement as applied to [§ 1125(a)].” 
(alterations in original)); Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349 
(5th Cir. 2002), superseded by statute, Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 
106-43, 113 Stat. 218 (1999)). 
 60. Id. at 784. 
 61. Id. at 788 (citing Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 
1059, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Awarding profits is proper only where the defendant 
is attempting to gain the value of an established name of another.  Willful infringement 
carries a connotation of deliberate intent to deceive.”); Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. 
Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 191 (1st Cir. 2012); M2 Software Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., 223 F. App’x 
653, 656 (9th Cir. 2007); W. Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 427 
F.3d 1269, 1270 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
 62. Id. at 789. 
 63. 760 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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profits.”64  Moreover, the Federal Circuit saw “nothing in the 1999 
amendment [to] permit [it] to declare that the governing Second 
Circuit precedent [was] no longer good law.”65  Thus, based upon the 
Federal Circuit’s application of the George Basch test, it affirmed the 
district court’s decision that “Romag [was] not entitled to recover 
Fossil’s profits, as Romag did not prove that Fossil infringed willfully.”66  
Romag appealed the Romag I decision to the Supreme Court.67 
2. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. ( Romag II) 
On March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari of the Romag 
I decision and simultaneously vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision.68  
The Court remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration 
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in a patent case, SCA 
Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC.69 
In a per curiam opinion on May 3, 2017, the Federal Circuit 
reinstated sections II and III of its Romag I decision, affirming the 
district court’s judgment declining to award Fossil’s profits.70  Simply 
put, the Federal Circuit reinstated its determination that the Second 
Circuit’s willfulness requirement for claiming a trademark infringer’s 
profits remains good law.  The Federal Circuit reasoned that such 
                                               
 64. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 789 (quoting George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 
F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 65. Id. at 789–90 (noting that the legislative “history [of the 1999 amendment] does 
not even acknowledge the pre-1999 split in the courts of appeals on the willfulness 
requirement for a recovery of infringer’s profits, much less indicate a desire to change it”). 
 66. Id. at 791.  Although not relevant in the instant case because there was no 
threshold finding of willfulness, George Basch also holds that although “a finding of 
willful deceptiveness is necessary in order to warrant an accounting for profits . . . it 
may not be sufficient,” meaning, equitable factors must also be evaluated, even after 
the threshold willfulness requirement is satisfied.  George Basch Co., 968 F.2d at 1540–
41.  Such equitable factors include:  “(1) the degree of certainty that the defendant 
benefited from the unlawful conduct; (2) availability and adequacy of other remedies; 
(3) the role of a particular defendant in effectuating the infringement; (4) plaintiff’s 
laches; and (5) plaintiff’s unclean hands.”  Id. (“The district court’s discretion lies in 
assessing the relative importance of these factors and determining whether, on the 
whole, the equities weigh in favor of an accounting.  As the Lanham Act dictates, every 
award is ‘subject to equitable principles’ and should be determined ‘according to the 
circumstances of the case.’” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1988)). 
 67. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1373, 1373 (2017). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (citing SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 
137 S. Ct. 954 (2017)) (rejecting laches as a defense against damages for alleged patent 
infringement that occurred within a limitations period). 
 70. Romag II, 686 F. App’x 889, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 
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reinstatement was proper, given the Supreme Court’s direction to 
reconsider the Romag I decision in light of SCA Hygiene, which “was 
solely concerned with the defense of laches against a claim for patent 
infringement damages” and, therefore, had no effect on the trademark 
aspects of the Romag I decision contained in sections II and III.71  The 
time for appeal has passed with no further appeal being requested.72 
C. Genericness 
1. In re Cordua Restaurants, Inc. 
Among the substantive trademark decisions issued by the Federal Circuit 
in 2016 was an analysis of genericness in In re Cordua Restaurants, Inc.73  In 
this case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board’s (TTAB) refusal to register a stylized form of the word mark 
“CHURRASCOS”—a common term for grilled meat—finding substantial 
evidence supporting TTAB’s determination that the term was generic as 
applied to a chain of restaurants serving a signature dish of grilled steak.74 
In 2008, Cordua obtained Registration No. 3,439,321 (the 
“Registration”) for the service mark CHURRASCOS (in standard 
character format) for use of the word in connection with “restaurant 
and bar services; catering.”75  In 2011, under application 85,214,191 (the 
“Application”), Cordua sought registration of the mark at issue in this 
case—a stylized form of CHURRASCOS for use in connection with 
“[b]ar and restaurant services; [c]atering.”76 
                                               
 71. Id.  On August 9, 2017, the Federal Circuit issued its revised opinion on the 
patent issue involved in Romag I in light the SCA Hygiene decision.  Romag III, 866 F.3d 
1330, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 72. On June 9, 2017, the Federal Circuit issued a “mandate” for its Romag II 
decision (which reinstated the Romag I decision as to the trademark issues).  The 
Federal Circuit issues a mandate “[seven] days after the time to file a petition for 
rehearing expires, or [seven] days after entry of an order denying a timely petition for 
panel rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion for stay of mandate, 
whichever is later.”  FED. R. APP. P. 41.  Additionally, the time to file another petition 
for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court expired ninety days after the Federal 
Circuit issued its decision in Romag II on May 3, 2017. 
 73. 823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 74. Id. at 598, 606; see also In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1227, 1234 
(T.T.A.B. 2014) (affirming refusal of registration of Serial No. 85/214,191), aff’d, 823 
F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 75. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 598. 
 76. Id. 
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Figure 1:  Cordua’s Mark in the Application 
 
The Application was rejected as generic under Lanham Act 
section 2(e)(1),77 and, on appeal, the TTAB affirmed the examiner’s 
refusal, agreeing that “‘churrascos’ is the generic term for a type of 
cooked meat and a generic term for a restaurant featuring churrasco 
steaks.’”78  Further, the TTAB held that “Cordua’s earlier registration 
of the underlying CHURRASCOS word mark . . . had no bearing on 
whether the stylized form of CHURRASCOS was generic.”79 
Cordua appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the 
Registration had “achieved incontestable status” after five years of use and 
that TTAB’s “failure to fully consider the incontestable registration [in 
evaluating the Application was reversible] error.”80  At a minimum, 
Cordua argued the presumption of validity accorded to the Registration 
based upon its registration on the Principal Register should have served 
as prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark in the Application 
because both use the same word for the same services.81 
The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed all prior 
findings of genericness.  Its opinion can be separated into four parts.  
First, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that incontestability is irrelevant 
for the purposes of determining whether a mark is generic because a 
“registered mark that has become generic may be cancelled at any 
time.”82  Second, the Federal Circuit explained that the presumption 
                                               
 77. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2012). 
 78. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 598 (quoting In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1227, 1232, 1234) (“The Board also agreed with the examiner that the 
stylized form of CHURRASCOS was also ineligible for registration because it is merely 
descriptive of a restaurant serving barbecued steaks and because Cordua had not 
provided sufficient evidence of acquired distinctiveness.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 597–99. 
 81. Id. at 600 (“The general presumption of validity resulting from federal registration 
includes the specific presumption that the trademark is not generic.”(quoting Coca-Cola 
Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
 82. Id. at 599–600 (citing Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 
194 (1985) (“Generic terms are not registrable, and a registered mark may be canceled 
at any time on the grounds that it has become generic.”); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Generic terms, by 
definition incapable of indicating source, are the antithesis of trademarks, and can 
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of a registration’s validity does not attach to a new application for a 
mark that is similar or identical.83  Instead, every new application for 
trademark registration will be reviewed separately on the merits.84  
Third, in assessing whether the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) met its burden to prove genericness of the stylized mark at issue 
by clear and convincing evidence, the Federal Circuit explained the 
issue is not whether “CHURRASCOS” is considered generic in terms 
of Cordua’s restaurants, but whether the term identifies a broader 
group of restaurant services as understood by the general public.85  
Specifically, the court held that the PTO must apply the two-part test 
established in H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. International Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, 
Inc.86 to (1) determine “the genus of goods or services at issue” and 
(2) whether “the term sought to be registered or retained on the 
register [is] understood by the relevant public primarily to refer to that 
genus of goods or services.”87 
The Federal Circuit noted that the TTAB “misse[d] the point” in the 
few instances where its analysis suggested “that ‘churrascos’ is generic 
as applied to Cordua’s own restaurant services.”88  Ultimately, however, 
the court upheld the TTAB’s decision, finding that it had substantial 
evidence on which to affirm the examining attorney’s determination 
that “the general public (the consumers of restaurant services) 
understands that churrascos is generic for a type of restaurant, 
specifically a restaurant that serves ‘churrascos.’”89 
In particular, the court affirmed that the TTAB was correct to base its 
genericness determination upon three English-language dictionaries 
defining “churrasco” as grilled meat—and, under the foreign 
equivalents doctrine,90 “would have been justified in translating 
                                               
never attain trademark status.”)). 
 83. Id. at 600. 
 84. Id. (quoting In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 85. Id. at 602 (citing H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 
F.2d 987 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 86. 782 F.2d 987 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 87. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 601 (quoting H. Marvin Ginn Corp., 782 F.2d at 990). 
 88. Id. at 602.  The court cited In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 
1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009), to explain that the inquiry should focus on the “goods or 
services for which the applicant sought protection, as set forth in its trademark 
application.”  See In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 602. 
 89. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 601 (citing In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 110 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1227, 1229 (T.T.A.B. 2014), aff’d, 823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 90. The doctrine of foreign equivalents is the doctrine by which the PTO considers 
the English translation of foreign language marks when it evaluates the similarity of 
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‘churrascos’ into ‘barbecue’ and subsequently determining whether the 
term ‘barbecue’ is generic when applied to restaurant services.”91  The 
TTAB was also correct to give no weight to the addition of “S” to make 
the word plural (whether such spelling was correct or not).92 
Additionally, in response to Cordua’s argument that an individual 
menu item does not indicate the type of restaurant services, the 
Federal Circuit clarified that a generic term for a classification of goods 
is also generic for any services centered on those goods.93  Accordingly, 
the court did not find an error in the TTAB’s reliance on a number of 
newspaper and magazine articles showing that “the restaurant-going 
public understands the term ‘churrascos’ to refer to a type of 
restaurant as well as a dish” and thus, the mark refers to a class of 
restaurants, and the public uses the mark to refer to that class of 
restaurant.94  At the same time, the Federal Circuit noted that this 
decision should not be interpreted to “suggest that the term 
‘churrascos’ is necessarily generic as to any and all restaurant 
services”—to the contrary, the result may have differed in an 
application for “a narrower sub-genre of restaurant” like “vegetarian or 
sushi restaurants” whose main feature is not grilled meat.95 
Lastly, the Federal Circuit assessed Cordua’s argument that the 
stylization of the CHURRASCOS mark in a “unique and arbitrary font” 
rendered it eligible for registration on the Principal Register.96  To be 
sure, a mark that is descriptive or otherwise unregistrable on the 
Principal Register may be registrable if “the design features of the 
asserted mark create an impression on the purchasers separate and apart from 
the impression made by the words themselves, or if it can be shown . . . that 
the particular display . . . has acquired distinctiveness.”97  Cordua failed to 
establish that the stylization of CHURRASCOS satisfied either of these 
alternative bases of registrability.  Specifically, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that “Cordua did not argue . . . that [the] stylization 
                                               
marks as a factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve 
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 91. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 603. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 604 (quoting In re CyberFinancial.Net, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1789, 1791 
(T.T.A.B. 2002)). 
 94. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 95. Id. at 605. 
 96. Id. at 606. 
 97. Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re Sadoru Grp., Ltd., 105 U.S.P.Q.2d 1484, 1486 
(T.T.A.B. 2012)). 
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create[d] a separate impression.”98  Similarly, the Federal Circuit 
determined that Cordua “did not argue that the stylization (i.e., the 
graphic quality) of the stylized form of CHURRASCOS [had] acquired 
distinctiveness.”99  Rather, Cordua “argued only that the underlying 
word mark ha[d] acquired distinctiveness”—which, the Federal Circuit 
explained, could not “save [the mark] from ineligibility as generic.”100 
D. Use in Commerce 
1. Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG 
In another case examining the fundamentals of trademark 
protection, Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG,101 the Federal 
Circuit reaffirmed the broad meaning of “use in commerce” under the 
Lanham Act and, accordingly, reversed the TTAB’s cancellation of the 
mark “ADD A ZERO” on hats based upon its narrow interpretation of 
“use in commerce.”102  In particular, the Federal Circuit disagreed with 
the TTAB holding that the “documented sale of two marked hats to an 
out-of-state resident were de minimis and therefore did not constitute 
use of the marks in commerce under the Lanham Act.”103 
In March 2005, Christian Faith Fellowship Church (“Church”) 
submitted two trademark applications—“one for use of ‘ADD A ZERO’ in 
standard characters and another for a stylized design of the phrase”—
based upon actual sales, including the sale of two hats bearing the mark 
in February 2005.104 
Based upon a likelihood of confusion with these marks, the PTO 
refused adidas AG’s (“Adidas”) application for the clothing mark 
“ADIZERO.”105  Adidas filed to cancel the Church’s registrations, arguing, 
among other things, that it failed to use the marks in commerce before 
registration.106  The TTAB considered the Church’s cancelled check for 
the sale of the two marked hats for $38.34 in February 2005, but found 
                                               
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. 841 F.3d 986 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 102. Id. at 995. 
 103. Id. at 987.  In addition, the Federal Circuit held that the check at issue was 
admissible under the business records exception to hearsay and that substantial 
evidence supported TTAB’s finding that parishioner who wrote the check resided out-
of-state, in Wisconsin.  See id. at 989–90. 
 104. Id. at 988. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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that such sales “within the state of Illinois to [a person] who reside[d] 
outside the state [did] not affect commerce that Congress can regulate” 
as required under the Lanham Act.107  In short, such sales were 
“insufficient to show use that affects interstate commerce.”108 
Under 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), in order to register a trademark, the 
owner must show that the applied-for mark has been “used in 
commerce.”109  The Lanham Act explains that use means “the bona 
fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely 
to reserve a right in a mark,” for instance, when a mark is used on “goods 
[that] are sold or transported in commerce.”110  Further, the Lanham Act 
defines the term “commerce” to include “all commerce which may 
lawfully be regulated by Congress.”111 
The Federal Circuit reiterated that “Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause is broad.”112  In particular, the court cited the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wickard v. Filburn,113 which interpreted 
the Commerce Clause to vest Congress with the power to “regulate 
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce . . . 
‘[e]ven if . . .  [the particular] activity be local and though it may not 
be regarded as commerce.’”114  This broad “substantial effects” 
interpretation has been repeatedly and recently reaffirmed, including 
by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich115 as well as Taylor v United 
States.116  Raich reaffirmed that when “a general regulatory statute bears 
                                               
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 988–99. 
 109. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2012). 
 110. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 989 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127). 
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 112. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 990 (citing Larry Harmon Pictures 
Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 662, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 113. 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (holding that activity must be considered in the 
aggregate, and that the appellee-wheat farmer’s “own contribution to the demand for 
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal 
regulation where . . . his contribution, taken together with that of many others 
similarly situated, is far from trivial”). 
 114. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 991 (second and third alterations 
in original) (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125). 
 115. 545 U.S. 1, 6–8, 17 (2005) (upholding application of the Commerce Clause to 
personal cultivation of marijuana, noting that “case law firmly establishes Congress’s 
power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ 
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce”). 
 116. 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2077–78 (2016) (concerning interpretation of a statutory 
provision that defines “commerce” under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3) (2012) to include 
“all . . . commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction”). 
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a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of 
individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence,” 
and Congress has the power to regulate it under the Commerce 
Clause.117  And, of particular relevance to the Church’s claim to its 
ADD A ZERO registrations, Taylor clarified that “proof that the . . . 
conduct in and of itself affected or threatened commerce is not 
needed,” rather, “[a]ll that is needed is proof that the . . . conduct fell 
within a category of conduct that, in the aggregate, had the requisite 
effect” on commerce.118  The Federal Circuit also cited many of its past 
Lanham Act “use in commerce” cases to support the broad scope of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, noting that the TTAB “erred by 
not properly applying [its] holdings in [Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. 
Williams Restaurant Corp.]119 and [In re Silenus Wines].”120 
Based upon this extensive recounting of case law confirming the 
broad scope of the Lanham Act’s definition of commerce as “all activity 
regulable by Congress,” the Federal Circuit held that it was “clear . . . 
that the Church’s sale of two ‘ADD A ZERO’-marked hats to an out-of-
state resident [was] regulable by Congress under the Commerce Clause 
and, therefore, constitute[d] ‘use in commerce’ under the Lanham 
Act.”121  The Federal Circuit went on to explain that the Church did not 
need to demonstrate actual and specific effect of interstate commerce 
or that the hats were destined for out-of-state travel.122  Moreover, the 
Federal Circuit clarified that any cases that may conclude that the 
Lanham Act “requires commercial activities . . . beyond that which is 
sufficient for Congress to regulate commercial activity under the 
Commerce Clause,” are not correct and the TTAB was wrong to rely on 
them.123  Having reversed the TTAB’s decision to cancel the mark for 
failure to use it in commerce, the Federal Circuit remanded the case for 
                                               
 117. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 991 (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 17). 
 118. Id. at 992 (second alteration in original) (quoting Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2081). 
 119. 929 F.2d 662, 666 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (refusing to adopt a de minimis test for use 
in commerce determinations). 
 120. 557 F.2d 806, 808–10 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding that the intrastate sale of 
imported French wine constituted “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act); see 
Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 992–94. 
 121. Christian Faith Fellowship Church, 841 F.3d at 987, 992–93 (stating further that 
“it cannot be doubted that the transaction at issue—the private sale of goods, 
particularly apparel, to an out-of-state resident—is ‘quintessentially economic’”). 
 122. Id. at 993. 
 123. Id. at 994–95 (explaining that the underlying meaning of “in commerce” in 
the Lanham Act is the same as the Commerce Clause and is governed by Larry Harmon 
and the Supreme Court decisions discussed above). 
2018] 2016 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS 1429 
 
the TTAB to address Adidas’s other grounds for cancellation.124 
E. Proper Identification of Goods and Services 
1. In re Jobdiva, Inc. 
In In re Jobdiva, Inc.,125 the Federal Circuit considered a case in which 
the TTAB granted a counterclaim for cancellation based on a bright 
line rule that if a term is used as the name of a product (in this case a 
computer program) that is sold or licensed in commerce, that name 
cannot also be a service mark unless it is specifically used to identify a 
separate service offered in connection with that product.  The Federal 
Circuit vacated the TTAB decision after determining that the TTAB 
had applied the wrong test in evaluating whether the mark was used in 
connection with certain services.126 
The TTAB applied this bright-line test to two service mark 
registrations owned by JobDiva, Inc. (“JobDiva”) for services that it 
primarily offered through a “software as a service” (“SaaS”) model.127  
Specifically, JobDiva secured the first registration in June 2004 for the 
standard character mark JOBDIVA under Registration No. 2,851,917, 
covering “personnel placement and recruitment” services (the “Word 
Mark”).128  In November 2005, JobDiva obtained Registration No. 
3,013,235 for its design.129 
Figure 2:  JobDiva Design Mark 
 
The registration states that it covers “personnel placement and 
recruitment services; computer services, namely, providing databases 
featuring recruitment and employment, employment advertising, 
career information and resources, resume creation, resume transmittals 
                                               
 124. Id. at 995. 
 125. 843 F.3d 936 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 126. Id. at 937. 
 127. Id. at 937–38, 941 (“As the Board explained, JobDiva’s SaaS model of software 
delivery also changes the way that users interact with JobDiva: ‘The users pay for the 
computing as a service rather than owning the machines and software to do it.’” 
(quoting JobDiva, Inc., Cancellation No. 92050828, 2015 WL 3542849, at *2)). 
 128. JOBDIVA, Registration No. 2,851,917. 
 129. In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d at 937. 
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and communication of responses thereto via a global computer 
network” (“Design Mark”).130 
In April 2009, JobDiva petitioned to cancel a registration for the 
mark JOBVITE, claiming it was likely to be confused with its federally 
registered JOBDIVA trademarks.131  In June 2009, Jobvite 
counterclaimed seeking cancellation of the JOBDIVA registrations as 
they relate to and for failure “to perform personnel placement and 
recruitment services.”132  After years of unsuccessful settlement 
negotiations between the parties, the TTAB resumed proceedings and 
concluded that JobDiva had not presented any evidence to support its 
claim that it used the JOBDIVA marks in connection with “personnel 
placement and recruitment services” separate and apart from the sale 
of the computer program.  On this basis, the TTAB granted the 
counterclaim and ordered the PTO to (a) cancel the Word Mark 
registration in whole and (b) amend the Design Mark registration by 
deleting the “personnel placement and recruitment” services.  JobDiva 
filed a request for reconsideration of that decision and the TTAB 
denied that request.  At the same time, the TTAB denied the petition 
to cancel the JOBVITE registration.133  JobDiva appealed the decision 
on the counterclaim but did not appeal the denial of its petition to 
cancel the JOBVITE registration.134 
In reviewing the TTAB analysis, the Federal Circuit disagreed with 
the TTAB’s bright-line approach, holding that it “erred in its 
understanding of the law” by requiring JobDiva to “prove that ‘it [was] 
rendering “personnel placement and recruitment” as an independent 
activity distinct from providing its software to others.’”135  Instead, the 
Federal Circuit held that “[t]he proper question is whether JobDiva, 
through its software, performed personnel placement and recruitment 
services and whether consumers would associate JobDiva’s registered 
marks with personnel placement and recruitment services, regardless 
of whether the steps of the service were performed by software.”136 
                                               
 130. Id.; see JOBDIVA, Registration No. 3,013,235. 
 131. JobDiva, Inc. v. Jobvite, Inc., Cancellation No. 92050828, 2015 WL 2170162, at 
*1–3 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 16, 2015). 
 132. In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d at 938. 
 133. JobDiva, Inc., Cancellation No. 92050828, 2015 WL 2170162, at *18. 
 134. Brief for Appellant at 2, In re JobDiva, Inc., 843 F.3d. 936 (No. 15-1960), 2015 
WL 6948862, at *2. 
 135. In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d at 939–41 (quoting JobDiva, Inc., Cancellation No. 
92050828, 2015 WL 3542849, at *4). 
 136. Id. at 937. 
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The Federal Circuit noted that this fact-specific approach aligned with 
the TTAB’s “initial observation that, with modern technology, the line 
between services and products sometimes blurs”137 and that “‘[i]n today’s 
commercial context if a customer goes to a company’s website and 
accesses the company’s software to conduct some type of business, the 
company may be rendering a service, even though the service utilizes 
software.’”138  Based on these modern complexities, the Federal Circuit 
reasoned that “[t]o determine whether a mark is used in connection with 
the services described in the registration,” the TTAB must factually assess, 
on a case-by-case basis, whether there is sufficient evidence that “a user 
would associate the mark with” the identified services.139  The Federal 
Circuit thus vacated and remanded the counterclaim case for 
reconsideration under the proper legal standard.140  Upon remand, the 
TTAB vacated its decision ordering cancellation of the Word Mark 
registration and amendment of the Design Mark registration after Jobvite 
failed to show good cause why it should not do so.141 
II. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
Although the Federal Circuit reversed the majority of lower court 
rulings for the substantive issue cases discussed above—including two 
of three TTAB rulings—it upheld all three TTAB rulings in appeals 
related to procedural issues.  These cases are discussed below. 
A. Excusable Neglect 
1. Westlake v. Barrera 
In Westlake v. Barrera,142 the Federal Circuit held that the TTAB acted 
within its discretion to dismiss a cancellation proceeding when it 
                                               
 137. Id. at 940 (citing JobDiva, Inc., Cancellation No. 92050828, 2015 WL 3542849, 
at *2). 
 138. Id. (quoting In re Ancor Holdings, No. 76213721, 2006 WL 1258813, at *3 
(T.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2006)).  The Federal Circuit also noted that it had previously upheld 
a TTAB decision recognizing that “software may be used by companies to provide 
services.”  Id. at 941; cf. On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1088 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming that American Online, Inc. used its “ONLINE TODAY” 
mark in connection with providing “users access to the [i]nternet news and 
information service” as described in its service mark registration). 
 139. In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d at 941–42 (internal citations omitted). 
 140. Id. at 936. 
 141. JobDiva, Inc. v. Jobvite, Inc., Cancellation No. 92050828, 2017 WL 2391866, at 
*1–2 (T.T.A.B. May 04, 2017). 
 142. 659 F. App’x 622 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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determined that the petitioner did not show good cause for his failure 
to timely submit evidence to support his cancellation claim against a 
third party’s registration.143 
This case began when the petitioner, Mr. Westlake, filed a petition 
for cancellation against a trademark registration owned by Mr. 
Barrera, the respondent.144  The petition for cancellation alleged:  
(1) that the respondent fraudulently procured the registration; and 
(2) that the respondent’s mark falsely suggested a connection to 
petitioner.145  The petitioner, however, failed to submit evidence to 
support his claim, failing to even timely respond to the show cause 
order issued six months after the initial July 29, 2014, deadline for 
submitting testimony.146  Mr. Westlake offered no excuse for this delay 
“except to say it was difficult to publish [his periodical] on a monthly 
basis and respond to the various motions filed by” Mr. Barrera.147 
To assess whether such grounds for failure to timely submit evidence 
could be deemed “excusable neglect,”148 the TTAB borrowed from a 
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment 
                                               
 143. Id. at 624.  The Federal Circuit reviews such determinations of the TTAB under 
a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.  See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp., 
931 F.2d 1551, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 144. Under Registration No. 3,662,484, issued August 4, 2009, Mr. Barrera owns a 
mark consisting of the words “THE NATIONAL POLICE GAZETTE THE LEADING 
ILLUSTRATED SPORTING JOURNAL IN AMERICA” and the accompanying design: 
Figure 3:  Barrera Mark 
 
Id. 
 145. Westlake, 659 F. App’x at 623; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012) (discussing the 
requirements for a petition to cancel a registration of a mark). 
 146. Westlake, 659 F. App’x at 623. 
 147. Id. at 624 (alternation in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 148. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 391–
95 (1993) (explaining that Courts of Appeals have found that “excusable neglect” may 
apply in situations where a party’s failure to comply with a filing deadline was 
inadvertent or was otherwise reasonable under a review of the totality of the 
circumstances). 
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Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd.149  Under the Pioneer standard for 
excusable neglect, the TTAB considered “‘all relevant circumstances,’ 
including ‘the danger of prejudice to the [non-movant], the length of 
the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason 
for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control 
of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.’”150  Using 
this rubric, the TTAB found that the petitioner’s “failure to take 
testimony or offer evidence was not the result of excusable neglect.”151  
The TTAB reasoned that this was inexcusable because the petitioner 
did not seek an extension to file such evidence “until after [the TTAB] 
issued its show-cause order” and “after the scheduled testimony-
submission periods of both parties had” long expired.152  Moreover, the 
TTAB determined that the purported reason for the petitioner’s delay 
was within his control, which “weigh[ed] strongly” against him.153  
Having concluded that the neglect was not excusable, the TTAB 
dismissed the cancellation petition.154 
On appeal, Mr. Westlake asserted that the TTAB should have taken 
“Mr. Barrera’s repeated delays and bad faith” into account in evaluating 
whether his delay could be deemed excusable neglect.155  In reviewing the 
TTAB’s decision, the Federal Circuit found that the TTAB had 
considered “Mr. Barrera’s actions, [but] deem[ed] them not to excuse 
Mr. Westlake’s failure to prosecute his case.”156  Moreover, to the extent 
Mr. Westlake actually sought to have the Federal Circuit craft a new 
standard for assessing excusable neglect, the Federal Circuit held that it 
was not its “function under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.”157 
Identifying no error in the TTAB’s use of the Pioneer standard of 
“excusable neglect” and no abuse of discretion in its application of the 
                                               
 149. 507 U.S. 380, 381, 383 (1993); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(B) (explaining 
that a court may extend the time by which a party may comply with a court deadline if 
the party moves for such an extension based on “excusable neglect”); TMEP 
§ 509.01(b)(1) (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tbmp-master-document-
Jun2017.pdf (“[M]ovant must show that its failure to act during the time previously 
allotted therefor was the result of excusable neglect.”). 
 150. Westlake, 659 F. App’x at 623 (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 395). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 624. 
 153. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (citing In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
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standard to the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB 
judgment in full.158 
B. Failure to Function as a Trademark and Material Alteration on Appeal 
1. In re Light 
The Federal Circuit next addressed procedural issues raised in the 
context of two appeals by pro se appellant Prema Jyothi Light, In re 
Light (Light I )159 and In re Light (Light II ).160  The appeals were raised 
in response to the TTAB’s refusal to register two marks consisting of 
over 500 words each because of their failure to function as trademarks 
and Light’s material alteration of the original applied-for marks.161 
In July 2001, fifteen years before the Federal Circuit’s decision, Light 
filed applications to register the full-text of the two images reproduced 
below for use on cartoon prints, paper dolls, and coloring books.162 
  
                                               
 158. Id. at 624–25. 
 159. In re Light (Light I ), No. 76293326, 2013 WL 6858009 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013). 
 160. In re Light (Light II ), No. 76293327, 2013 WL 6858010 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013). 
 161. See Light I, No. 76293326, 2013 WL 6858009, at *1; Light II, No. 76293327, 2013 
WL 6858010, at *1. 
 162. In re Light (Light III), 662 F. App’x 929, 932 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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Table I:  Light’s Proposed Marks163 
 
Light’s applications for these marks were initially rejected because the 
examiner determined “that each sought to register multiple marks.”164  
Light responded by attempting to amend the applied-for trademarks, 
but those amendments were rejected because the proposed changes 
were considered material alterations.165  The applications were deemed 
abandoned after Light failed to timely respond to those refusals, but the 
applications were later successfully revived and remanded to the 
examining attorney to determine whether the original applied-for 
marks constituted “registrable subject matter,” i.e., whether they 
functioned as trademarks.166 
Following the remand, the examining attorney refused registration on the 
basis that the subject matter of the applications failed to function as 
                                               
 163. Id. at 931–32. 
 164. Id. at 932. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
Application 1: 
SHIMMERING BALLERINAS & 
DANCERS CHARACTER 
COLLECTION 
Application 2: 
SHIMMERING RAINFOREST 
CHARACTER COLLECTION 
 
  
Light’s proposed mark “ha[d] 
approximately 660 words and 
identifie[d] more than ninety 
character names.” 
Light’s proposed mark “had 
approximately 570 words and 
identifie[d] more than 125 
character names.” 
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trademarks.  The examining attorney explained that the full-text marks 
“‘fail[ed] to function’ as trademarks,” but explained that “Light could 
overcome the failure-to-function rejections by amending the proposed marks 
to only seek registration of the stylized wording in the top left-hand 
corners: . . . the ‘SHIMMERING BALLERINAS & DANCERS’ [and] the 
‘SHIMMERING RAINFOREST.’”167  Light did not amend her claims as 
advised or file new applications for more limited marks, but instead appealed 
the examiner’s refusal, submitting revised specimens with even more details 
and claiming that the “proposed marks had acquired distinctiveness in 
accordance with [s]ection 2(f) of the Lanham Act.”168 
In Light’s final administrative appeal, the TTAB affirmed the refusal 
to register the marks, agreeing that the marks failed to function as 
trademarks for two reasons:  (1) the number of words was too great for 
consumers to usefully differentiate one source from another; and 
(2) the proposed amendments did nothing to assist the marks’ overall 
subject matter because the “specimens reveal that the matters ‘merely 
identif[y] what appears to be a title (e.g., of a story) and a list of 
fanciful, fictional names.’”169  Additionally, the TTAB determined that 
Light’s various proposed amendments “would effect material 
alterations of the original subject matter” because each such 
amendment would necessitate new conflicting mark searches.170  Light 
appealed these decisions to the Federal Circuit, which reviewed and 
ultimately upheld each determination in In re Light (Light III ).171 
First, to reject Light’s contention that the marks should be registrable 
because they were “easily recognizable,” the Federal Circuit explained 
that the “mark must be perceived by the relevant public as conveying the 
commercial impression of a trademark.”172  In other words, “the mark 
                                               
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 932–33. 
 169. Id. at 933 (last alteration in original) (quoting Light I, No. 76293326, 2013 WL 
6858009, at *3–6 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013); Light II, No. 76293327, 2013 WL 6858010, 
at *2–5 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013)). 
 170. Id.  (describing the following as the specific issues with Light’s proposed 
amendments:  (1) “removing the columns and displaying the character names instead 
in a radial or ‘starburst’ manner [would] ‘create[] a new commercial impression’”; 
(2) “converting the proposed stylized mark to a ‘single standard character mark’ 
would likewise result in a mark ‘with a very different appearance and commercial 
impression’”; and making similar observations about (3) “adding a ‘colorful 
background, stars, and rays of light emanating from the top’” (quoting Light I, 
2013 WL 6858009, at *7–8; Light II, 2013 WL 6858010, at *6–7)). 
 171. 662 F. App’x 929, 934 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 172. Id. 
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must identify the source of goods.”173  The court also noted the TTAB’s 
numerous factual determinations “in support of its conclusion that the 
relevant public would not perceive Light’s proposed marks as 
identifying the source of goods.”174 
Next, the Federal Circuit rejected Light’s claim that the amended 
marks did not materially alter the original applied-for marks.175  Under 
37 C.F.R. § 2.52, a trademark applicant must submit a drawing of the 
mark and may amend a drawing so long as the amendments would not 
“materially alter” the mark.176  According to Federal Circuit precedent, 
an amendment is material if “the mark would have to be republished 
after the alteration in order to fairly present the mark for purposes of 
opposition.”177  Although the TTAB analyzed three distinct 
amendments, Light only challenged the TTAB’s finding on one of 
them.178  Other than Light’s reference to § 807.14(e)(ii) of the 
Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure,179 she failed to provide any 
evidence to support this particular challenge.180  Given the evidence in 
support of the TTAB’s rejection and the fact that it often uses § 807.14 
in concluding that any additional elements requiring a further search 
would constitute a material alteration,181 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the TTAB’s rejection of Light’s proposed amendments as well as its 
judgment overall.182 
                                               
 173. Id. (citing In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 174. Id. at 934–35 (noting that “at best, ‘readers and users of [Light’s books would] 
understand the applied-for matter as simply identifying a title or theme for [Light’s] 
playbook, [and] a corresponding list of character names in the playbook’”) (last 
alteration in original) (quoting Light I, 2013 WL 6858009, at *5; Light II, 2013 WL 
6858010, at *4). 
 175. Id. at 937. 
 176. Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2.72(a)(2) (2016)). 
 177. Id. (quoting In re Hacot-Colombier, 105 F.3d 616, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 178. Id. (citing Light I, 2013 WL 6858009, at *7–8; Light II, 2013 WL 6858010, at *6–
7) (explaining that Light challenged the TTAB’s determination on her addition of “‘a 
colorful background, stars, and rays of light emanating from the top left corner’” of 
the mark (internal quotations omitted)). 
 179. Appellant’s Brief at 23, Light III, 662 F. App’x 929 (Nos. 2014-1597), 2015 WL 
180577, at *23 (stating that § 807(e)(ii) requires “the addition, deletion, or 
amendment of color features in a design mark does not result in a material alteration 
of the mark”). 
 180. Light III, 662 F. App’x at 937. 
 181. The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure states that “the addition of any 
element that would require a further search will constitute a material alteration.” 
TMEP § 807.14 (Oct. 2017). 
 182. Light III, 662 F. App’x at 937. (last alteration in original) (citing In re Pierce 
Foods Corp., 230 U.S.P.Q. 307, 308 (T.T.A.B. 1986)). 
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C. Anti-Trafficking Prohibition 
1. In re Emerald Cities Collaborative Inc. v. Roese 
In its last procedural trademark case of 2016, In re Emerald Cities 
Collaborative Inc. v. Roese,183 the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s 
interpretation of a contract as an improper assignment of an intent-to-
use application to a third party in violation of the Lanham Act’s anti-
trafficking rule under 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1),184 rendering the 
subsequently issued registration invalid.185 
The ownership chain in this case starts with Perry Orlando, who 
applied in November 2008 to register THE EMERALD CITY as a 
standard character mark for use “in business development and 
consulting services in the renewable energy industry.”186  In November 
2009, the PTO issued a Notice of Allowance, giving Orlando until May 
2010 to file a Statement of Use (“SOU”) to fulfil the Lanham Act’s use 
in commerce requirements to register the mark.187 
The next month, on December 30, 2009, Orlando signed a “perpetual” 
and immediately effective “Trademark Assignment and License” 
agreement (“Agreement”) with Emerald Cities Collaborative, Inc. 
(“ECC”).188  As relevant here, the Agreement stated that “Orlando 
own[ed] certain rights in the [THE EMERALD CITY] Mark” and that 
“Orlando agree[d] to convey and assign unto ECC, all right, title and 
interest in and to the Mark . . . at such time as the Mark is registered at the 
[PTO].”189  Additionally, the Agreement specified that “ECC [would] 
promptly pay Orlando $25,000” and “upon payment of such amount, Mr. 
Orlando [would] appoint[] Joel Rogers [ECC’s cofounder] as his Power 
of Attorney (with the full power of substitution and resubstitution) for the 
                                               
 183. 666 F. App’x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 184. The anti-trafficking rule of 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) limits the assignment of 
applications and prohibits the buying and selling—or trafficking—of non-existent 
marks.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2012) (“[N]o application to register a mark . . . 
shall be assignable prior to . . . the filing of the verified statement of use . . . except for 
an assignment to a successor to the business of the applicant . . . to which the mark 
pertains, if that business is ongoing and existing.”). 
 185. In re Emerald Cities Collaborative, Inc., 666 F. App’x at 909–10, 912; 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1060(a)(1) (2012) (stating that “no application to register a mark under section 
1051(b) of this title shall be assignable prior to the filing of an amendment under 
section 1051(c)”). 
 186. In re Emerald City Collaborative Inc., 666 F. App’x at 909. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 909. 
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limited purpose of allowing ECC . . . to take over continued prosecution of the 
application for the Mark.”190  Lastly, the Agreement provided that ECC 
would “pay Orlando $40,000 as a final installment upon registration of the 
[M]ark at the PTO” and that, should ECC terminate the Agreement, 
“Orlando [must] promptly cease use of the Mark.”191 
In April 2010, Orlando filed the requisite SOU to support registration 
of THE EMERALD CITY Mark, listing the date of first use “as early as 
January 15, 2010,” and adding an appointment of counsel, namely, ECC’s 
attorneys.192  The PTO accepted the SOU and registered the Mark on July 
6, 2010 under Registration No. 3,814,868.193  That same day, Orlando 
entered a written agreement with ECC assigning his “entire interest in the 
[M]ark to ECC ‘with an effective date of July 6th 2010 . . . pursuant to 
[the] 2009 Trademark Assignment.’”194 
Three months later, in October 2010, ECC filed an action to oppose 
registration of the mark EMERALD CITIES, which Sheri Jean Roese, 
the applicant, had applied for in September 2009.195  To defend her 
application, Roese counterclaimed to cancel ECC’s mark as invalid for 
violating 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1)—the Lanham Act’s anti-trafficking 
rule.196  In particular, the Lanham Act’s anti-trafficking rule states that 
an application to register a mark through an intent-to-use application 
may not be assignable prior to filing an SOU.197  The Lanham Act 
provides only one exception to this rule, which permits assignment to 
a successor of an applicant’s business if the business is ongoing and 
existing.198  ECC did not claim that the Agreement fell within this 
exception, but rather contended that the Agreement was not subject 
to this provision because it did not transfer the mark until July 6, 
2010.199  The TTAB, however, agreed with the applicant and canceled 
ECC’s registration because it determined that the Agreement 
                                               
 190. Id. at 909–10 (alterations in original) (noting, in particular, that pursuant to 
the Agreement, ECC would “be responsible for all payments in connection with the 
continued prosecution of the Mark in the United States or its possessions” and “ECC 
[would] have the exclusive right to file oppositions or claims against the users of 
confusingly similar trademarks”). 
 191. Id. at 910. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (alteration in original). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 912 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2012)). 
 198. Id. (quoting § 1060(a)(1)). 
 199. Id. 
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“constituted an improper assignment of the intent-to-use application 
[before the filing of the SOU] in violation of § 1060(a)(1).”200 
On appeal, ECC, the appellant, asserted that the TTAB “erred in 
construing the Agreement as an immediate assignment” that pre-dated 
the April 2010 filing of the SOU.201  In support, ECC argued that “the 
Agreement was merely an ‘agreement to assign [the Mark] in the 
future’”—specifically, “upon registration” on July 6, 2010.202  ECC also 
argued that the exclusive enforcement and quality control provisions 
of the Agreement only applied after the Mark was registered and that 
the Power of Attorney provision only created an “agent-principal 
relationship between Orlando, the trademark owner, and the 
appointed representative [ECC].”203  But, as explained below, the 
Federal Circuit rejected all of these arguments. 
Specifically, the Federal Circuit discussed three critical aspects of the 
Agreement that were “inconsistent with the interpretation . . . advocated 
by ECC that Orlando retained ownership between the effective date and 
the registration date.”204  First, instead of establishing an agent-principal 
relationship with Orlando as principal, the Agreement’s language 
“indicate[d] that Orlando ceded control over the intent-to-use 
application to ECC and instead became obligated to assist ECC in its 
registration of the applied-for mark.”205  Second, “the Agreement 
commence[d] on the Effective Date [of December 30, 2009]” and gave 
ECC “the right to control the quality of goods and services sold under the 
mark” starting from the Effective Date.206  And third, the Agreement did 
not restrict the appellant’s right to enforce the Mark to only a specific 
time period, but rather, prohibited Orlando from challenging the 
appellant’s use of the Mark, before or after its registration date.207  The 
Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that the Agreement’s purpose and 
execution was for Orlando to relinquish the Mark to the petitioner 
immediately as of the December 30, 2009, Effective Date.208 
Having affirmed the TTAB’s determination that the Agreement violated 
the Lanham Act’s anti-trafficking rule, the Federal Circuit “further 
                                               
 200. Id. at 910. 
 201. Id. at 911. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 912–13. 
 205. Id. at 912. 
 206. Id. at 912–13 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 207. Id. at 913. 
 208. Id. at 912. 
2018] 2016 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS 1441 
 
conclude[d] that the [TTAB] did not err in cancelling” ECC’s registration 
for THE EMERALD CITY.209  Lastly, “because ECC’s opposition to Roese’s 
application was based solely on the now canceled registration,” the Federal 
Circuit also affirmed the TTAB’s dismissal of ECC’s opposition to Roese’s 
EMERALD CITIES mark.210 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps less sensational than its 2015 docket, the Federal Circuit was 
still relatively active in the area of trademark law in 2016.  Its decisions 
bookended the lifecycle of a trademark—from the threshold criteria 
for obtaining a registration211 to the technicalities of losing one212 to 
use in international trade213 and discrepancies in obtaining particular 
enforcement remedies among the circuits.214  No doubt, the practical 
impact of clarifying these essential aspects of trademark law will 
influence trademark practice on a daily basis and reaffirm the Federal 
Circuit’s significant contribution to the law of trademarks with a few, 
well-reasoned decisions. 
                                               
 209. Id. at 914. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See In re Jobdiva, Inc., 843 F.3d 936, 940–41 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (covered goods 
and services); Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986, 987–95 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (use in commerce); In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 599–606 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (genericness); Light III, 662 F. App’x 929, 936–38 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(failure to function as a source of goods or services). 
 212. See In re Emerald Cities Collaborative Inc., 666 F. App’x at 910–12 (discussing the 
improper assignment of an intent-to-use application before filing an SOU). 
 213. See JBLU, Inc. v. United States, 813 F.3d 1377, 1379–82 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(relaxing country-of-origin labeling requirements for geographic terms associated with 
all trademarks—federally registered and common law unregistered). 
 214. See Romag II, 686 F. App’x 889, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Romag I, 817 F.3d 782, 
785–91 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
